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2Abstract
There is much controversy about whether the cooperative behaviours underlying the
functioning of human societies can be explained by individual self-interest. Confusion
over this has frustrated the understanding of how large-scale societies could ever have
evolved and be maintained. To clarify this situation, we here show that two questions
need to be disentangled and resolved. First, how exactly do individual social interac-
tions in small- and large-scale societies differ? We address this question by analysing
whether the exchange and collective action dilemmas in large-scale societies differ qual-
itatively from those in small-scale societies, or whether the difference is only quan-
titative. Second, are the decision-making mechanisms used by individuals to choose
their cooperative actions driven by self-interest? We address this question by extract-
ing three types of individual decision-making mechanism (three type of “minds”) that
have been assumed in the literature, and compare the extent to which these decision-
making mechanisms are sensitive to individual material payoff. After addressing the
above questions, we ask: what was the key change from other primates that allowed for
cooperative behaviours to be maintained as the scale of societies grew? We conclude
that if individuals are not able to refine the social interaction mechanisms underpinning
cooperation, i.e change the rules of exchange and collective action dilemmas, then new
mechanisms of transmission of traits between individuals are necessary. Examples are
conformity-biased or prestige-biased social learning, as stressed by the cultural group
selection hypothesis. But if individuals can refine and adjust their social interaction
mechanisms, then no new transmission mechanisms are necessary and cooperative acts
can be sustained in large-scale societies entirely by way of self-interest, as stressed by
the institutional path hypothesis. Overall, our analysis contributes to the theoretical
foundation of the evolution of human social behaviour.
Keywords: human social evolution, large-scale societies, cooperation, evolutionary psychol-
ogy, cultural group selection, institutions
31 Introduction
Understanding how large-scale human societies arose from small-scale ones and function is a
central quest in science. It raises the question of how far this major evolutionary transition
can be explained by the self-interested actor model common to the fields of (political) eco-
nomics (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001; Ober, 2008; Fukuyama, 2011),
archaeology (Stanish, 2017) and evolutionary biology (Alexander, 1987; Parker & Smith,
1990; Davies et al., 2012; Alcock, 2013; Alexander, 2014). The answer to this question is
crucial to improving our ability to engineer solutions to societal challenges, from climate
change to genocides (Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011; Alexander, 2014).
The behaviours that allow human societies to function and cohere are fundamentally
cooperative in nature, as exemplified by exchange of resources between individuals and
contribution to collective-action projects. Unlike any other species, humans today rely on
exchange of resources with non-kin for nearly all of their vital needs, from food, to shel-
ter, to medical care. Individuals exchanging resources are often unrelated and unfamiliar
strangers, who know little if anything about each other and engage in massively large-scale
and spatially-distributed collective-action projects. The contrast between modern human
social behaviour and that of other social species is exemplified by the existence of the in-
ternational space station – a pinnacle of human cooperation (Turchin, 2015). Constructing
the space station required contributions of millions of taxpayers from multiple states, and
required approximately three million person-years to build. It also involved massive division-
of-labour and specialisation in the production of its component parts.
The human species has spent most of its existence living in small-scale hunter-gatherer
societies (Boehm, 1999; Marlowe, 2005; Kelly, 2013). There are many cooperative behaviours
in these societies, from food sharing, through to cooperative hunting and construction of
dams (Kaplan et al., 2009; Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Hooper et al., 2015). But this cooperation
occurs in small groups where individuals are either kin or personally know each other,
directly or indirectly by reputation. Following the origin of agriculture around 10000 years
ago, humans started to live in larger and larger groups, culminating in the modern states
and space stations of today. These larger groups are only viable because of exchange and
collective-action occurring between individuals.
But why would individuals cooperate in this new environment? Do the same evolution-
4ary processes based on reproductive self-interest, which selected for cooperative behaviour
in small-scale societies and other primates, provide a sufficient explanation for the ultimate
reasons of such cooperation (Alexander, 1987; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; West et al., 2011;
Pinker, 2015; Tooby & Cosmides, 2016) or is a different and novel evolutionary process
needed (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Turchin, 2015; Henrich, 2016)? In other words, can co-
operation in large-scale societies be a (Nash) equilibrium behaviour among self-interested
individuals (North, 1990; Greif, 2006; Powers et al., 2016), or are individuals no longer be
acting in their own self-interests (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Turchin,
2015; Henrich, 2016)?
Despite much debate, there has been little movement towards a resolution of these ques-
tions, and hence little progress in understanding the evolutionary forces responsible for the
transition from cooperation in small-scale societies to that in large-scale societies. To resolve
this impasse, we here suggest that two mechanisms need to be disentangled theoretically and
then analysed empirically. First, there is a need to determine how social interactions in large-
scale societies are different from cooperation in small-scale societies. Are social interaction
mechanisms–the constraint relationships between behaviour and outcomes–in large-scale
societies qualitatively different from those in small-scale societies, or is the scaling up of
interaction mechanism merely quantitative, and so does not involve any new fundamen-
tal kind of behaviour? Second, and regardless of the scale of society, there is a need to
determine whether the decision-making mechanisms–the constraint relationships between
cognitive state1 and behaviour–used by individuals in interactions are driven by the incen-
tives to individuals. To what extent is decision-making in social interactions dependent on
individual rewards of cooperation? Because the decision-making mechanisms are likely to be
complex cognitive traits with a genetic basis, they are unlikely to have changed significantly
during the few thousand years since the origin of large-scale societies. This means that the
same evolved decision-making mechanisms must be used by individuals in both small- and
large-scale societies. However, different models of cooperation in large-scale societies have
made very different assumptions about the decision-making mechanism that individuals use,
and hence their sensitivity to incentives or self-interest.
This paper aims at contributing to the theoretical foundations of human evolution by
1The cognitive (internal) state of an individual itself depends on past (internal) state and the current
environmental input, according to some state transition mapping that is part of the definition of the decision-
making mechanism itself (Haykin, 1999; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2005).
5demonstrating the conceptual clarification that can be gained by disentangling interaction
mechanisms from decision making mechanisms for understanding the transition to large-scale
societies. We do so by addressing these mechanisms in a stylised way in three steps. (1) We
start by providing an operational definition of social interaction mechanisms that allows us
to delineate between different types of cooperative behaviours, and we synthesise what the
empirical literature tells us about the similarities and differences between cooperation across
human societal scales. (2) We then describe three broad decision-making mechanisms that
have been widely used to describe human behaviour, and that make different assumptions
about individual self-interest. We here synthesise what the empirical literature tells us about
sensitivity to incentives, and use this to evaluate the fit of the different decision-making
mechanisms to observed human behaviour. (3) Building on these concepts, we are led to
ask what was the key mechanism explaining the evolution of large-scale societies: was it a
change in the transmission mechanism, i.e. a change in the way traits are transmitted in
a population so that cooperation more easily spreads, or was it a change in the interaction
mechanism, i.e. did groups create new rules changing their social interaction mechanisms,
such that cooperation would still be favoured by self-interested individuals? We discuss
answers to this question in the light of the two main (evolutionary) hypotheses that have
been proposed to explain the transition to large-scale societies; namely, the cultural group
selection and the institutional path hypotheses.
2 Social interaction mechanisms in small-scale versus
large-scale societies
For more than 2 million years nomadic hunter-gatherers lived in small-scale societies. Fol-
lowing sedentarisation and the subsequent Neolithic Demographic Transition around 10 000
years ago (Bocquet-Appel, 2011), large-scale societies arose. These societies are large in
terms of number of individuals, and tend to have hierarchical organisation, i.e. chiefdoms
and states (Johnson & Earle, 2000). To discuss the differences and similarities of coopera-
tion in small- and large-scale societies, we start by introducing a model of social interaction
that underpins our analysis and that is independent of societal scale and of decision-making
or transmission mechanisms.
62.1 Games and material outcomes
We take our model of social interaction from game theory (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; Hur-
wicz, 1996), as this provides a common reference model across evolutionary biology and the
social sciences (Gintis, 2007). We consider that a social interaction consists of the (mea-
surable) behaviours (actions or stream of actions) of a group of interacting individuals and
material outcome(s) of such behaviours. Material consequences of actions are usually mul-
tidimensional, e.g. calorie intake, size of shelter, or time of activity. But we assume that all
material consequences of behaviours can be summarised by a single number, the material
payoff to an individual, from which average group material payoff can also be evaluated. Ma-
terial payoff is therefore a unifying currency, and this too has been used usefully to capture
incentives in evolutionary biology and the social sciences. Hence, we take a social interac-
tion as consisting of the behaviours and their material payoff consequences to interacting
individual. The set of possible social interactions is formally called a game form in game
theory (Hurwicz, 1996; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). This specifies all the behavioural options
—-actions or stream of actions (e.g. cooperate or defect) —- available to each individual in
a group and all their material outcomes. The game form thus defines the social interaction
mechanism, and colloquially it can be thought of as the “rules of the game”. This is often
simply called a “game” in evolutionary biology, which is a language we follow here.2
We will focus on social interactions involving a social dilemma so that the interaction
faced by individuals involve a tension between individual and group (material) payoff (Dawes,
1980; Kollock, 1998). We will call the action of an individual cooperative if (a) it increases
the average payoff to interacting group neighbours and (b) it decreases the individual’s own
payoff relative to the average among group neighbours. Importantly, a cooperative act so
defined does not say whether this act results in a net decrease or increase in the actor’s
payoff. It says, however, that if all group members cooperate, then average group payoff is
larger that if individuals do not cooperate, and each individual has a larger payoff if others
cooperate but itself. Hence the “dilemma”, which is ubiquitous in human interactions, from
the interpersonal to the international (Kollock, 1998).
2The definition of a game in game theory is the game form together with individual preferences (Hurwicz,
1996; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). It thus implicitly makes an assumption on the decision-making mechanisms,
i.e. that individuals have preferences and that they will choose actions to try to satisfy those. This is
unfortunate as the definition of a game therefore conflates social interaction mechanisms and decision-making
mechanisms.
7Another key observation of human social interactions is that individuals can change the
rules of the game that they play, i.e. individuals can change the social interactions mechanism
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996; Greif, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2005). An institution
is defined as a family of games (game forms) that individuals can potentially choose between,
given the current constraints of their physical environment and their technology (Hurwicz,
1996). The hallmark of an institution is the presence of two sets of social interactions (Powers
et al., 2016, p. 3): (i) active genesis of institutional rules through communication and/or
bargaining by the individuals in a group – this is a political interaction (Hurwicz, 1996;
Reiter, 1996); (ii) social interactions whose outcomes are material and which are affected by
the institutional rules – this is the economic interaction. The key idea behind an institution
is the formalisation of the point that humans, unlike other animals, can self-modify the
material payoff structure of their social interactions, whereby they play both political and
economic games. The former generates the institutionally devised rules (the “institutional
rules”) of social interactions defining the latter, and may possibly involve many informal and
spontaneous communication events between subsets of the group of interacting individuals.
2.2 Two broad types of social dilemmas
Any cooperative act in the economic game can be placed on a scale representing the exclud-
ability of the economic good that it involves. At the one end of this scale is the voluntary
exchange of private goods between individuals. These are goods that the actor controls or
otherwise has property rights over, meaning that other individuals can readily be excluded
from using them. Exchange of private goods allows individuals to obtain resources that they
want but do not currently have. It also allows gains in efficiency from division of labour and
specialisation (North, 1990; Greif, 2006). But it is not obvious that individuals will choose to
engage in exchange, for two reasons. First, one individual must part with its goods before it
receives anything in return. This means that an individual risks being cheated and receiving
nothing in return (Greif, 2000). Second, the individual offering a good inherently knows
more about its quality than the receiver, creating an information asymmetry that can be
used to exploit the other party (North, 1990). Hence, exchange involves a social dilemma.
At the other end of the excludability scale are collective actions that involve the pro-
duction and consumption of public goods such as village fortifications, or common-pool
resources such as fish stocks, grazing land, or irrigation water (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990).
8It is costly to monitor the behaviour of individuals producing and using this type of good,
and hence to exclude those that do not contribute to it. This means that there is a social
dilemma because of the temptation to enjoy the benefits without expressing the cooperative
acts underpinning their production (Olson, 1965).
In the following discussion we categorise cooperative acts based upon whether they are
closer to private (“exchange” games) or public goods/common-pool resources (“collective
action” games) on the excludability scale.
2.3 The world until yesterday: cooperation in small-scale societies
2.3.1 Exchange
Hunter-gatherers engage in several types of exchange between individuals, and since such
exchanges involve time and energy they necessarily involve cooperative behaviour. The most
well studied is the exchange of meat between large-game hunters, i.e. food sharing. Male
hunters donate food to other hunters in their group when they make a kill, and in turn
receive food when the latter are successful. The exchange occurs repeatedly – essentially for
an indefinite number of times – between members of the camp, which would number around
30 individuals (Marlowe, 2005; Kelly, 2013). The exchange of meat is also personal (North,
1990; Greif, 2006). People obtain first-hand information about the behaviour of others –
they remember exactly who they have given food to in the past, and remind them of this
when they are themselves hungry. This is supported by systems of institutional rules that
regulate the conditions under which individuals should give food to others, and which apply
to the whole group (Kaplan et al., 2009). Group members enforce these rules upon each
other through a variety of sanctions ranging from gossip and public ridicule through to hiding
and ostracism (Boehm, 1999). Hunter-gatherers also exchange one type of commodity for
another. A sexual division-of-labour is evident, particularly between males that specialise in
hunting, and females that specialise in gathering plant materials (Marlowe, 2007). Among
horticulturalists, we see the exchange of horticultural produce for meat, and the exchange
of childcare for labour and sick care (Jaeggi et al., 2016).
92.3.2 Collective action
Hunter-gatherers also engage in a variety of collective-actions related to subsistence, and
here too this involves time and energy and thus necessarily cooperative behaviour. A prime
case is cooperative hunting, where the actions of several individuals are necessary to prevent
a prey from escaping (Kaplan et al., 2009; Alvard & Nolin, 2002). Hunter-gatherers also
engage in various collective construction projects, such as burning habitat, and building
dams to trap fish (Kaplan et al., 2009). Because the number of individuals taking part
in the collective-action is relatively small, the payoff benefits are immediately and directly
felt by the participants. In a small group of five hunters, if one individual does not pull
its weight then it will directly feel the impact through a markedly reduced probability of
catching prey. The benefits to an individual of cooperating are also returned with a small
time delay, e.g. on the order of hours for cooperative hunting, or a few weeks for the
construction of dams. The cost that an individual pays to receive this benefit is measured
in terms of the opportunity cost of time and labour invested, or the direct contribution of
material resources. Institutional rules regulate how exactly the benefits of collective action
are distributed. For example, in the !Kung Bushmen, the owner of the first arrow that
penetrates the animal controls distribution after a cooperative hunt (Testart, 1987).
2.4 The world today: cooperation in large-scale societies
2.4.1 Exchange
In larger-scale societies we see the specialisation and division-of-labour that already existed
in hunter-gatherer societies become much more pronounced. Individuals now specialise in
one occupation, and obtain essentially all of their vital resources through exchange with
others. And this exchange is impersonal – it is often with unfamiliar strangers who may
never meet again (North, 1990; Greif, 2006; Seabright, 2010). Consequently, individuals
will not have first-hand information about how their exchange partners have behaved in the
past. But crucially, the institutional rules of the (economic) exchange game have changed to
account for this (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif et al., 1994; Greif, 2006). For example, credit
reference agencies supply information about the reputation of participants who will never
physically meet. This is essentially an elaboration of the spreading of reputation by gossip
seen in hunter-gatherers. Similarly, the state provides third-party enforcement of contracts
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through the sanctioning of individuals that do not act according to the agreed terms of
an exchange. This acts as an elaboration of the enforcement of exchange norms seen in
hunter-gatherer groups.
2.4.2 Collective action
Large-scale societies also engage in numerous collective actions, from building roads and
fortifications through to the use of irrigation systems and fishing waters. These goods are
produced and used by many more individuals, which means that the effect that any one
individual feels as a result of its own effort will be negligible. The result of the collective-
action can be delayed by a very long time, often on the order of years. As such, there would
seem to be more temptation to not cooperate than in small-scale societies. But crucially, the
institutional rules regulating collective actions have also changed. These now include third-
party sanctioning by the state, which is facilitated by collecting contributions from taxes
whose payment can be easily monitored. New institutional rules also incentivise individuals
to monitor each other’s use of common pool resources. An example is allowing monitors to
keep a share of the fine levied on any individual that they find taking more than the agreed
amount of resource (Ostrom, 1990; Guala, 2012).
2.5 Comparing cooperation across scales
As we move from small- to large-scale societies, a change in societal structure must occur
to account for the change in size (Bonner, 2011). A much higher degree of specialisation
and division-of-labour is observed in large scale societies, a feature predicted by the size-
complexity rule: bigger entities have greater division of labour (Bonner, 2004; Bourke, 2011).
At the same time, the exchange upon which this division of labour depends becomes more
impersonal, with individuals less likely to have first-hand knowledge about the past be-
haviour of their exchange partners. In collective action, we see the number of participants
become so large that the marginal effect of any one individual’s contribution is negligible.
Qualitatively, though, both small- and large-scale societies face the same types of ex-
change and collective action problems. The organisational problems, however, become more
difficult in large-scale societies, and as we increase scale we see more institutional rules
that spread out into new domains such as long distance trade and large-scale construction
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projects. The increase in the number of rules with the scale of a society is striking. For ex-
ample, the small-scale Kapauku Papuan society has around 120 rules regulating areas from
property rights through to punishment for murder, whereas 40 000 new laws took effect in
the United States in 2014 alone (Singh et al., 2017). From this we can infer that as societies
of any scale engage in new economic activities, the number of institutional rules that the
society generates increases.
3 Decision-making mechanisms and the maintenance of
cooperation in societies of any scale
3.1 Three broad decision-making mechanisms (“minds”)
So far, we have focused on the (economic) games individuals play in small- and large-scale
societies, and how these are at least in part humanly devised. But in itself this description
does not specify how or why individuals take cooperative actions. We now present three main
decision-making mechanisms (types of agent or“minds”) that have been proposed in different
fields of the literature to explain how individuals choose actions. For each hypothesised agent
type, we indicate what assumptions it makes about how individuals take actions and the
conditions that must hold for cooperative acts to be stable given this agent type.
(1) The Rational Strategising Mind (hereafter RSM). Individuals are assumed to
try to maximise their personal payoff (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Ober, 2008; Fukuyama,
2011), which we take in this paper as being material payoff. For a cooperative action to
be expressed it must be a (material) Nash equilibrium of the game at hand and hence
incentive compatible (Kreps, 1988; Hurwicz, 1996; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). This
is the standard model of human cognition assumed in economics, where it is used to
make predictions about how individuals will behave in exchange and collective action
situations. An RSM agent is a flexible, payoff-sensitive decision-making mechanism.
There is a whole spectrum of RSMs, from myopic agents choosing actions that max-
imise short-term payoff, through to fully forward-looking agents that act to maximise
long-term payoff, but all are self-interested.
For cooperative acts to be maintained in exchange and collective action games by
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RSMs, the game must be repeated with known or unknown individuals. Both the
conditioning of actions on past behaviour and endogeneous enforcement of property
rights and contracts can create incentives for this agent to cooperate in large-scale
societies (Milgrom et al., 1990; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; Binmore, 2005b; Mailath
& Samuelson, 2006; Binmore, 2006), and we emphasise that this really does hold
regardless of societal scale (see Milgrom et al., 1990 for a concrete example).
(2) The Pleistocene Adapted Mind (hereafter PAM). Individuals are assumed to
have evolved behavioural rules that serve the actor’s reproductive interest, that is,
behaviour is self-interested, where “self” refers to genes only, genes giving rise to
integrated individuals, or integrated groups of individuals, or combinations thereof
(Alexander, 2014, p. 89). These behaviour rules have evolved in the Pleistocene so-
cial environment of small-scale societies and personal interactions (the Environment
of Evolutionary Adaptedness, or EEA, e.g. Alexander, 1990; Barkow et al., 1992; Cos-
mides & Tooby, 2013). Human psychology is thus supposed to solve the survival and
reproductive puzzles posed by the EEA with individuals expected to treat interaction
partners according to their degree of genetic relationship towards them (Alexander,
2014, p. 93). This is achieved by evolved domain-specific decision-making algorithms
that were payoff-sensitive in the EEA. These are often called modules in evolutionary
psychology, and are functionally specialised to solve particular adaptive problems, e.g.
language acquisition, mate selection, or cooperative exchange (Lumsden & Wilson,
1981; Alexander, 1990, Barkow et al., 1992, p. 24). Modules may do varying amounts
of computation, ranging from a complex assessment down to the use of simple heuristic
rules (e.g. Gigerenzer & Brighton 2009). This is the model of human cognition used in
evolutionary psychology. It is used in thought experiments to make predictions about
how individuals will behave based on the selective pressures of the EEA (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1994).
The EEA would have selected for a psychology that initiates and monitors recipro-
cal exchanges, including specialised algorithms for detecting cheaters and calculating
the probability that an exchange partner will reciprocate (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).
PAMs would now cooperate in large-scale societies whenever these algorithms were
activated with inputs that resembled situations where it would have been incentive
compatible to cooperate in the EEA.
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(3) The Social Learning Mind (SLM).
Individuals are assumed to acquire their behaviour mostly from others through var-
ious forms of social learning. This is the standard model of human decision-making
assumed in much of the literature on cultural evolution on cooperation (Henrich &
McElreath, 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Richerson et al., 2016). This type of agent
may perform content-based social learning, where the choice of model to copy be-
haviour from depends upon the observed consequences of doing that behaviour. For
example, behaviours that are observed to lead to higher payoffs would be more likely to
be copied – this is a content-based transmission rule known as payoff-biased transmis-
sion. Alternatively, SLM agents may perform context-based social learning, in which
who else performs the behaviour may matter more than the expected material payoff
of doing that behaviour (Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Hen-
rich & Boyd, 2016). Context-based social learning is cognitively less demanding than
content-based learning, since it does not require the consequences of a behaviour to be
observed and evaluated.
If SLM agents are dominated by context-based rather than by content-based learning,
then they will be be insensitive to material payoff, and cooperation may be maintained
as an equilibrium behaviour regardless of the (economic) game that they play, provided
the agents have socially learned to cooperate. In that case how the type of exchange
and collective-action games, and hence institutions, incentivise behaviour does not
matter much because individuals are not self-interested. However, if individuals per-
form content-based social learning more frequently, they become more self-interested
and sensitive to material payoff when choosing actions. Then, the type of game will
matter more in explaining the sustainability of cooperative actions.
We wish to stress two points about these three agent types. First, the agent just de-
scribed are independent of the scale of the society, and so apply to explaining behaviour
in both small- and large-scale societies. Second, these agent types are necessarily abstract
caricatures of human cognition, since they correspond to the general theoretical assumptions
that researchers in different fields make about how human agents choose actions. While few,
if any, researchers would argue that the human mind literally functions as any of the three
agents and is likely to involve some mix of them, these caricatures are widely used to model
how individuals take actions and to make predictions about how humans will behave. It
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is indeed useful to draw caricatures in order to delineate clearly different hypothesis. And
to evaluate how well each model can explain human cooperative behaviour, we therefore
need to look at the weight of evidence that pulls humans towards and away from each of
the agent types. We discuss this here in relation to the payoff sensitivity of the different
agent types and for the context of expressing cooperative behaviour. We therefore rank the
decision-making mechanisms based on the extent to which choice of action is sensitive to
expected payoff.
We start by noting that all three agent types assume that individual behaviour is plastic:
none suggest that individuals have a hard-wired response to always cooperate or defect.
Further, they all assume that individuals can express behaviour that they learn over their
lifetime, although for PAM agents learning is domain specific and the content that is learnt
is biased by the evolved algorithms (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).
Next, we compare the agent types on the payoff-sensitivity scale, and can rank them from
the more to the less payoff-sensitive as follows: RSM, then PAM, and finally SLM. Indeed,
RSMs are expected to always try to increase their material payoff given the information
available to them. PAMs, on the other hand, are expected to make incentive compatible
decisions in situations that mirror the social environment of the EEA, e.g. where there is
information about the past behaviour of potential partners or cues to recognise relatives. But
they would be expected to undertake incentive-incompatible actions when environmental
cues trigger the evolved algorithms in inappropriate circumstances (Johnson et al., 2003;
Burnham & Johnson, 2005; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; Raihani & Bshary, 2015). For
example, individuals behave differently when “watched” by a pair of robotic eyes, which
could mistakenly trigger algorithms that are sensitive to reputation (Burnham & Hare,
2007).
SLMs could undertake incentive-incompatible actions if their choice of model to learn
from depends on context rather than content. For example, an SLM agent using a conformity-
biased transmission rule would be likely to choose an incentive-incompatible action if the
majority of other individuals in its group were also performing this action. Similarly, an
SLM agent using a prestige-biased transmission rule could choose an incentive-incompatible
action if a leader performed the action (Henrich et al., 2015).
Experimental economics has long demonstrated in the laboratory that individuals are
sensitive to material payoffs in exchange games that resemble the types of exchange problems
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identified above (Smith, 1962). Further, the levels of cooperation in a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma experiment are affected by whether the end point of the game is known, implying
that individual decisions to cooperate are affected by the equilibria of the game (Roth &
Murnighan, 1978). Individuals also adjust their behaviour in exchange situations in response
to the reputation of their partners (Milinski, 2016). This all implies that humans act as if
they were RSMs in these situations.
A different line of research involves experiments where cooperative acts are not incentive
compatible, particularly public goods games without incentives to cooperate, but argues
that individuals nevertheless still cooperate (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). This has been sug-
gested as evidence pushing humans away from being self-interested (Fehr et al., 2002; Boyd
et al., 2003). However, as in exchange games, when individuals play the public goods game
for a longer period of time then they often start to behave in an incentive compatible man-
ner (Binmore, 2005a; Sefton et al., 2007). Further, analysis of multiple experiments and
dissection of decision making reveals that such behaviour is likely to be consistent with re-
sponsiveness to payoff (Ledyard, 1995; Thomas et al., 2016; Burton-Chellew & West, 2013;
Burton-Chellew et al., 2015, 2017). Finally, these games do not correspond to the types
of exchange and collective action identified above. From these three points, we can con-
clude that the experiments where individuals do no behave as predicted by self-interest in
all rounds of the game cannot be taken to imply that humans are not sensitive to material
payoff in social interactions.
Some experiments have also reported quite substantial cross-cultural variation in be-
haviour in these games (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Gerkey, 2013). This
can be interpreted as support for SLM, since it suggests that localised context-based social
learning may be more important than maximising individual material payoff in determining
behaviours in cooperation situations. However, these differences could also be explained by
RSM or PAM agents acting in different economic environments (Baumard, 2013). Pertinent
environmental differences include the value of long-term relationships given the institutional
rules of the local market (North, 1990), and the fidelity with which reputational information
is transmitted (Delton et al., 2010; Greif, 2006). Variation in these features between cultures
would cause RSM agents to correspondingly vary their levels of cooperation.
We can also ask whether humans routinely perform conformity-biased social learning.
Conformity is very common in children (Haun et al., 2014), although this is reduced if the
16
actor being copied is not very successful at performing the task (Scofield et al., 2013; Schillaci
& Kelemen, 2014), or if conformity would conflict with the child’s existing knowledge (Sobel
& Kushnir, 2013). Moreover, several experiments with adults have demonstrated a lack of
conformity, especially in situations where conforming would result in a reduction in material
payoff (Lamba & Mace, 2011; Lamba, 2014; Burton-Chellew et al., 2015, 2017) and that
different individuals tend to use different social learning rules (van den Berg et al., 2015;
Molleman et al., 2014).
Taken as a whole, the experimental literature demonstrates that incentive compatibility
is a key driver of individual decision making in social interactions. Humans also seem to
have mental modules for abstraction that allow them to create models of causality, and thus
potentially conceive rules of interactions to regulate cooperative actions (Fukuyama, 2011),
which pushes them away from SLMs on the payoff sensitivity scale. However, there is a
pressing need for continued empirical work in both experimental and field studies to more
precisely place our species on the payoff-sensitivity scale. A particular focus should be placed
on the different time frames of net positive payoffs, i.e. whether the benefit is immediate or
delayed, and whether it is conditioned on past behaviour towards the same partner (direct
reciprocation) or based on reputation effects.
4 Transmission mechanisms vs social interaction mech-
anisms
As discussed in Section 2, large-scale societies both exist and are dependent on cooperative
acts for their existence. Yet, evolutionary theory shows that, everything else being equal, the
selection pressure on cooperative actions decreases drastically as group size increases and is
unlikely to be favoured in large groups (Powers & Lehmann, 2017 for a review). So what was
the key mechanism that allowed for cooperation to be sustained in the transition from small
to large-scale societies? As emphasised in Section 3, there seem to be no real qualitative
difference in the social dilemmas that individuals experience in small and large-scale societies.
At the same time, the type of agent cannot have changed dramatically between small-
and large-scale societies. Given this, two different hypotheses, the cultural group selection
and the institutional path hypotheses, have been proposed to explain the maintenance of
cooperative behaviour in the transition to large-scale societies. Both hypotheses turn out
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to implicitly assume a quantitative scaling up of the same kinds of exchange and collective
action problems, but differ in what mechanism must have changed from other primates
societies to allow cooperation to evolve in large groups.
4.1 New transmission mechanisms
The first hypothesis is the cultural group selection hypothesis (Richerson et al., 2016), which
posits that the main driver maintaining the expression of cooperative behaviour in the
transition to large-scale societies is that humans exhibit novel mechanisms of transmission
of behaviours between individuals. While the standard vertical transmission mechanism
of population genetics or its analogue in cultural evolution, payoff-biased social learning
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985), are prevalent among other pri-
mates, humans are hypothesised to have a fondness for copying the majority behaviour in
the group (conformist-biased transmission mechanism) or copying the behaviour of a leader
(prestige-biased transmission mechanism). Hence, humans are assumed to be largely SLM
agents using context-based social learning mechanisms because they have difficulty evalu-
ating the costs and benefits of their actions, and so are not very sensitive to payoff. If
different groups reach different patterns of behaviour, some with more cooperative acts,
and some with less, then conformity-biased or prestige-biased transmission could maintain
cooperative patterns of behaviour to be equilibria, because they decouple behaviour choice
from payoff. Explicit formal models investigating these processes, and holding everything
else constant in comparison to standard vertical transmission, have so far generally failed to
show that conformist-biased transmission favours the spread of cooperative action (Lehmann
& Feldman, 2008; Molleman et al., 2013; Van Cleve, 2016; Powers & Lehmann, 2017), but
prestige-biased transmission fares better (see Molleman et al., 2013 for the most exhaustive
analysis to date).
The process of cultural group selection may however be reinforced if competition be-
tween groups involves the physical displacement of less cooperative groups by their more
cooperative neighbours, e.g. through warfare (Turchin et al., 2013). Group competition by
physical movement of individuals is also known as demic diffusion (Ammerman & Cavalli-
Sforza, 1984). This is compatible with context-based, payoff insensitive, social learning
mechanisms. However, competition between groups could also take the form of individu-
als either migrating to more successful groups, or imitating individuals in more successful
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groups (Richerson et al., 2016). This is also known as cultural diffusion (Fort, 2015) and
could be driven by context, with individuals migrating to larger groups or to groups with a
prestigious leader. Cultural diffusion could also be driven directly by content, with individ-
uals being sensitive to payoff when choosing which group to migrate. However, in this case
there would need to be a mechanism of social interaction which ensures that cooperative
behaviours give a higher payoff than non-cooperative actions within groups.
4.2 New social interaction mechanisms
The second hypothesis is the institutional path hypothesis (Powers et al., 2016), which posits
that the driver maintaining the expression of cooperative behaviour in the transition to large-
scale societies is that humans have changed their social interaction mechanisms (changed
the rules of the game), instead of changing the transmission mechanisms. Individuals are
thus assumed to play political games affecting the economic game. The hypothesis is that
as groups grew in size, individuals have refined and created new mechanisms supporting
exchange by providing information about the past behaviour of a greater number of inter-
action partners, and/or to have changed systems of monitoring and sanctioning to handle
larger numbers of individuals in collective action. These new mechanisms of social interac-
tion would lead to cooperative actions increasing material payoff, and hence can be favoured
even by self-interested individuals. This is compatible with RSM agents, and also with PAM
agents to the extent that the institutional rules recreate the conditions for cooperation in
the EEA. PAMs would be expected to favour the creation of institutional rules similar to
those found in small-scale societies in circumstances that are ecologically similar to the EEA
(Boyer & Petersen, 2012; Petersen et al., 2012, 2013), e.g. to create rules of uniform sharing
in periods of high resource variance (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).
The types of economic games a group ends up with will be influenced by proximate fac-
tors such as asymmetries in power, influence, and information (Singh et al., 2017), which
determine the outcome of the political game. Furthermore, only a subset of the individuals
affected by the institutional rules may take part in the political game, and the interests of
those taking part may not be representative of the interests of the group as a whole. Con-
sequently, the institutional rules need not be optimal for all group members, as exemplified
by the rise of highly despotic states such as Ancient Egypt, where despotic leaders biased
institutional rules in favour of themselves. As such, the institutional path hypothesis is
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compatible with the widespread existence of inefficient institutions (North, 1990; Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2011). On the other hand, when the interests of group members are aligned, or
bargaining strengths are equal, then efficient institutions are more likely to evolve (Ostrom,
1990; North, 1990; Greif, 2006).
The evolution of the ability to create and enforce rules by self-interested individuals,
especially over food sharing and property rights, would have been necessary to support the
hunter-gatherer lifestyle (Hill, 2009). If hunter-gatherers did not play political games, then
the institutional path hypothesis cannot explain the origin of large-scale societies. But there
is evidence that hunter-gatherers do indeed play political games, even though they lack the
bureaucratic elements of large-scale societies. For example, when the extant Ache hunter-
gatherer society transitioned from foraging to horticulture, they advocated and voted in local
meetings to transfer fields from public to private ownership (Kaplan et al., 2005). Further
studies are needed to examine how other institutional rules in extant hunter-gatherers are
formed.
4.3 Implications for cooperation in large-scale societies
Overall, the above analysis shows that a key question in determining the driving factors
in the transition to large-scale societies is what decision-making mechanism determines the
expression of cooperative action. If individuals are sensitive to payoff, then there must have
been a change in the social interaction mechanisms, as proposed by the institutional path
hypothesis. Without such a change, individuals should stop cooperating as group size in-
creased because, when everything else is constant, the pressure on cooperation decreases
rapidly with increasing group size. Conversely, if there was no change in the social inter-
action mechanisms then individuals must be less sensitive to payoff and hence a change in
transmission mechanism used must do the work in explaining why cooperation is stable in
large-scale societies.
Because humans undoubtedly do use social learning, the ingredients of the cultural group
selection hypothesis may be partly complementary to those of the institutional path hypothe-
sis (depending on the exact conceptualisation of “cultural group selection”, see Pinker, 2015
for a discussion on this point). Indeed, competition between groups acts as an equilib-
rium selection device (Harsanyi & Selton, 1988; Boyd & Richerson, 1990; Binmore, 2005b),
20
favouring equilibria that lead to a higher average payoff for group members. Cultural group
selection traditionally stressed that these were equilibria because of particular mechanisms
of transmission between individuals within groups (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Boyd et al.,
2011; Henrich et al., 2015). However, cooperative equilibria can also exist within groups
under classic vertical or payoff-biased transmission, or under RSM agents that rationally
choose their actions, if the right mechanisms of social interaction are in place. In this case,
group competition can again act as an equilibrium selection device, spreading by cultural
transmission mechanisms of interaction that lead to cooperation, without individuals act-
ing against their self-interest (Harsanyi & Selton, 1988; Boyd & Richerson, 1990; Binmore,
2005b). This can act alongside the creation of mechanisms of interaction by bargaining and
negotiation, helping to fill in where individuals are less than fully rational. On the other
side, an explicit consideration of the political game for changing mechanisms of interaction
can complement cultural group selection models, which typically leave unspecified how a
group arrives at a particular equilibrium in the first place.
Despite the ingredients of the cultural group selection and institutional path hypotheses
not being necessarily mutually exclusive, there is a need to understand whether the main
driver of the evolution of cooperation in large-scale societies is a change in mechanism of
transmission or of interaction. Without clarification, the perennial question of whether
cooperation in large-scale societies is compatible with self-interested individuals will remain.
Measuring the mechanisms of transmission that have led to the evolution of behaviours in the
real world is challenging. However, determining whether observed cooperative behaviours are
currently incentive compatible is less challenging. For example, we can more easily determine
whether systems of monitoring and sanctioning are“altruistic”, or whether they are incentive
compatible for the individuals doing the monitoring and sanctioning (Ostrom, 1990; Guala,
2012). If it is the former, then this suggests that novel mechanisms of transmission were key
to determining their spread and maintenance. If it is the latter, then the creation of new
mechanisms of interaction is likely to have been the key driver. Empirical work should thus
pay more attention to the payoff sensitivity of monitoring and sanctioning behaviours.
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5 Conclusion
Is the self-interested actor model of economics and evolutionary biology sufficient to explain
the maintenance of the expression of cooperative behaviour during and after the transition
to large-scale societies? To answer this question and narrow down the space of possible hy-
potheses explaining this evolutionary transition, we have emphasised that two mechanisms
need to be disentangled. First, are social interaction mechanisms in large-scale societies
qualitatively different from those in small-scale societies? Our review of the literature sug-
gests that the answer is no. Both scales of society face fundamentally the same type of
private exchange and public collective-action problems, but these problems became more
difficult to solve on a quantitative scale in large-scale societies. Second, what is the decision-
making mechanism by which individuals choose actions in exchange and collective-action
scenarios? This must be the same in both small- and large-scale societies, as there would
not have been not enough time in the past 10 000 years for genetic evolution to radically
change the type of agent. The empirical evidence implies that humans are largely driven
by material-payoff incentives in a way consistent with RSM and content-based SLM agents,
but within constraints set by evolved preferences and predispositions as expected by PAM.
In light of these two assessments, we asked the question: what key mechanism allowed
cooperative acts to be maintained as the size of private exchange and public collective-action
problems increased? On one side the cultural group selection hypothesis focuses on the need
of novel transmission mechanisms of behaviour. By stressing the role of context-based social
learning mechanisms, it places far less importance on self-interest, and considers individuals
to be SLM agents who are low on the payoff sensitivity scale when expressing cooperative
actions. On the other side, the institutional path hypothesis focuses on the role of novel
humanly-devised social interaction mechanisms. By stressing the role of changing the rules
of the game, it assumes self-interested individuals and thus represents a null hypothesis
compatible with standard economics and (genetic) evolutionary biology. Our analysis across
societal scales suggests that it also provides a sufficient explanation for the maintenance
of cooperation in the transition to large-scale societies. Having operationally delineated
between three key mechanisms involved in this transition, we hope our paper contributes to
resolving the impasses underlying the theoretical foundations of human evolution.
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